Fostering Trust and Cooperation in
Health Care:
Learning from the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Digest of a presentation by Robert Axlerod, Ph.D.
Monday, April 26, 1999
Answers the questions:
- How can we attend to the damaged trust that exists
within and between health care organizations?
- How can we strategically employ cooperation and competition
in nurturing relationships in health care?
Introduction: The Prisoner’s Dilemma
In the health care industry, many are operating in
a con-text where trust is damaged — whether it is within an organization,
or between organizations and communities. Dr. Axelrod offers some intriguing
insights into the nature of this trust, and the effects of competition.
Even in the simplest of relationships, the dynamics
of competition can be complex. This is famously illustrated in a scenario
known as the prisoner’s dilemma. Here’s how it works. Imagine
that two men are captured, taken prisoner and then separated by their
captors. Each prisoner is then made an offer by his captor: Betray the
other prisoner (per-haps by sharing information) and receive a lighter
punish-ment. Unable to communicate with one another, each pris-oner
is now tempted to betray his partner in exchange for more favorable
treatment.
The possibilities and their results might be summarized
like this:
|
Prisoner B
is loyal
|
Prisoner B
betrays
|
Prisoner A
is loyal
|
3 — 3
|
0 — 5
|
Prisoner A
betrays
|
5 — 0
|
1 — 1
|
Thus, if both prisoner A and prisoner B remain loyal,
both refusing to betray the other, they each receive three “points.”
(Points in this case are used only symbolically, to indicate advantage.)
Consider this scenario from the point of view of pris-oner A:
- “If I remain loyal to prisoner B, my best-case-scenario
is 3 and my worst-case scenario is 0.”
- “But if I betray prisoner B, my best case-scenario
is 5, and worst is 1.”
- “Therefore, either way I am better off betraying
pris-oner B. Defecting is always better than cooperating.”
Meanwhile, prisoner B is coming to the same conclu-sion
that it is better to defect. In this structure that encour-ages both
parties to defect, both end up losing.
This scenario plays out in television crime dramas
fre-quently. It can also be seen in real-life arms races between countries,
price wars and in natural systems in which two groups must share a limited
food resource. Prisoner B Prisoner B
The Roles of Time and Learning in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma
In actuality, Prisoner’s Dilemma scenarios are rarely
“one-move” games. Rather, both parties typically have opportunity to
“play” over and over (as in escalating arms races.) As they do this,
they begin to explore strategies for cooperating and defecting, and
each begins to learn about his opponent.
Over time, a scenario might play out like this:
Round
|
You
|
Other
|
Your
score
|
Other’s
score
|
1
|
C
|
C
|
3
|
3
|
2
|
C
|
C
|
3
|
3
|
3
|
C
|
D
|
0
|
5
|
4
|
D
|
D
|
1
|
1
|
5
|
D
|
C
|
5
|
0
|
For example, in rounds 1 and 2, both parties choose
to cooperate (C), and both are rewarded. But then, in round 3, one party
chooses to defect (D) thereby profiting even more. However, this move
produces consequences in round 4, with damaged trust provoking a mutual
defection that causes both to lose. And on it goes in a continuing dance
of trust and cooperation, collaboration and conse-quences.
“Tit-for-Tat:” The Simplest Strategy for Cooperation
and Competition
What are some strategies, one might wonder, for inter-acting
in this competitive context? When should we coop-erate? When should
we defect? Is there a balance between cooperating too much (and being
a “sucker”) and defecting too much (thereby becoming a “bully”)?
In exploring this, Dr. Axelrod asked mathematicians,
behavioral theorists and political scientists to offer strate-gies for
the best way to play this game. They developed many complex strategies
that took into account different variables such as learning styles,
etc.
However it turned out that the single most effective
strategy was also the simplest, developed by a computer. The strategy
is called “tit-for-tat,” and it consists of just two simple maneuvers:
- Cooperate on the first move.
- On following moves, do whatever the other player
did.
The strategy is distinguished by the following characteris-tics:
- It is nice. Those who
employ the tit-for-tat strategy are never the first to defect. This
is critical to building a trustful environment, and is the biggest
predictor of success.
- It is provocable. When
the other party defects, the first party responds immediately and
clearly.
- It is forgiving. If
the other party backs off, then the first party responds in kind.
“Let bygones be bygones.”
- It is simple. This
is not computer chess. The tit-for-tat strategy requires little strategic
planning.
Basic Principles about Cooperation
- Cooperation can evolve even among parties who
are moti-vated by self-interests. The tit-for-tat
strategy of reci-procity is powerful even between “egoists,” or parties
who are motivated by self-preservation. However, two conditions must
be present for the tit-for-tat strategy to work:
- Individuals must be able to recognize those they have interacted
with, and be able to recall what happened.
- Both parties must be able to see that their rela-tionship will
continue for some period into the future. After all, if the relationship
is near an end, one might as well defect. But if both parties
are “in this together” for awhile, both have incentive to build
a cooperative relationship.
- Cooperation does not require foresight or communication.
Surprisingly, it’s not necessary to talk to the other guy in order
for the tit-for-tat strategy to work. In effect, you response becomes
your communication. This could be observed in World War I, where enemy
units tended to be very fixed in their position for long periods.
Over time, these enemies learned to “livewith” one another by developing
a cooperative “live and let live” strategy without ever communicating
or having relationships.
- Tit for Tat is a robust strategy. The
strategy of reciproc-ity spreads quickly. As one party continually
models it (beginning with a cooperative move), the other party can
quickly discern the pattern, and adopt the strategy themselves. If
there are a lot of players in the world, it doesn’t take long for
reciprocity to spread throughout the population. All that is required
is that a few people model it at the outset.
- A reciprocity strategy can never score better
than the other player. From a short-term perspective, use of the
strat-egy does not win any rounds. But from a long-term perspective,
it allows both parties to “win the tourna-ment.”
Application to International Politics
The tit-for-tat reciprocity strategy, Dr. Axelrod illustrates,
has played out many times in international politics. A review of military
threats over the last 100 years reveals that most were successfully
deterred when the tit-for-tat model was employed. Specifically, the
threats were deterred when two conditions were present:
- Military responses to threats were delivered at
the same level of power as the threat, rather than exceed-ing or failing
to match the challenger.
- Diplomatic responses to threats were firm, and car-ried
an offer to reciprocate compromise. Successful responses were never
unyielding, nor were they uni-lateral accommodations.
Reciprocity is a natural strategy that is reinforced
by international practices such as trade agreements. During the cold
war, it can be observed that the U.S. and Soviet Union quickly reciprocated
each others’ actions.
Questions from Bosnia
Dr. Axelrod was invited to the United Nations during
the Bosnian conflict, with the intent of bringing the Serbs, Croats,
Muslims, Macedonians and Hungarians together, and see if they could
talk to each other and build mutual respect. After presenting the prisoner’s
dilemma, partici-pants asked some important questions:
- Can the reciprocity strategy work if one side
is stronger than the other? Yes. Provocability
is possible, as long as each side perceives that the other can punish
them — even if the degree of power is not symmetrical.
- What if there are more than two players in the
prisoner’s dilemma? In the Bosnian conflict, for example, there
were seven local and five international players. However, in such
cases the players typically form alliances. Once they organize and
polarize in two groups, the dynamics are the same.
- What if there is so much hatred that the parties
do not even accept each other’s existence? Again,
there needs to be a sense of shared future in order for the two groups
to begin interacting. In a game of Monopoly, one’s goal is to bankrupt
the opponent and then end the game. A reciprocity strategy does not
work in this case. But in a non-zero sum game (which is what our existence
in the world is), the goal is not to defeat the other player. There
must be a shared understanding among both parties that they will live
in the same world together.
Noise and Misunderstandings
While working with the United Nations to develop a strategic
approach to arms control, Dr. Axelrod found that large organizations
(in this case, countries) often had mis-understandings. In effect, one
party says “I cooperated, but the other side saw it as a defection.”
This is “noise,” or mis-understanding of the response. (This was the
case when Soviets shoot down an intruding Korean airline.)
This presents a problem: When such misunderstanding
occur, there needs to be forgiveness — but forgiveness invites exploitation.
This happened during the end of the Gorbachev period, when the Soviets
were very soft and for-giving... and as a result were exploited.
There are two approaches to dealing with noise:
- Be contrite. Do not be provoked by a “justified”
defec-tion by the other.
- Be generous. Cooperate
some of the time when you would otherwise have defected.
Over time, employing these responses during misunder-standing
will help to further engender a context of trust.
Opportunities in Health Care
What are some arenas in health care for fostering coopera-tion
via a strategy of reciprocity? There are many:
- Between organizations: Competition for patients;
Alliances among health care orgs., such as HMOs, hospitals, partnerships;
Health care orgs. and regula-tors.
- Within an organization: Between doctors;
Between doc-tors and nurses; Between management and unions.
- Between doctors and patients.
Summary
- Cooperation among egoists (players who care only
about their own success) can succeed on the basis of reciprocity.
- For this to work, there must be recognition of the
other player, and a continuing interaction.
- Tit for tat is a robust strategy; it self-perpetuates
and spreads within a system.
- A balanced level of generosity or contrition is
helpful.
- Trust derives from the shadow of the future. It
requires continuing interaction.
- The dynamics of this strategy are the same among
fish, people and nations. Maybe it can even work with health care.
Q & A with Dr. Axelrod
Q: “In our group,
there are a few of us stuck in defecting. We are an independent hospital
with escalating problems with a small clinic. This has been going on
for three years. Its hurting us, the hospital and the whole community.
The doctors are making money, and they don’t see any nega-tive consequence.
What can we do?”
A: This is a deep rut you’re in. The
problem is that the participants don’t see the consequences. As a result,
the doctors are just exploiting the situation. You need to introduce
consequences for defecting doctors. They must see how this is hurting
them — for exam-ple, another group threatens to take them over. Someone
needs to initiate those consequences.
Q: In health care, we tend to have
people sit around a table and talk, talk, talk. What’s the difference
between finding one answer and using the tit-for-tat strategy?
A: Remember the trench warfare scenario,
where there was no verbal communication at all. But if their snipers
killed one of our guys, then we would recip-rocate. Action is important;
You don’t really need for-mal communication.
However, communication with words can help by shortening
the cycle. You can say “this is my inten-tion, to be reciprocating.
And if you do X, I will respond by doing Y.”
Also, you can say “here’s the kind of behavior that
I find unacceptable. If you do this, I will be provoked.” Clarify what
counts as defection, what counts as cooperation.
Q: What about management and staff
relationships in a non-union context? How can reciprocity work there?
A: When the staff is not formally organized, it is more complex
to employ this strategy. A lot of times, the management would prefer
to have a central person on staff to deal with. But without that, norms
do devel-op. “Here is what we expect of you as a staff member, and here
are the consequences.” It has to be fair, con-sistent and impartial.
Q: What is the threshold of provocability?
A: I was surprised to find that it pays to be provocable right
away. I figured it would make sense to be nice for a while at the beginning,
but that is not the case. If you let lots of defections build up on
the other side, it’s harder to “punish them enough.” Also, the more
you wait, the more you look like a sucker. So it pays to respond right
away and at roughly the same level.
Q: What if the two sides have different ideas
on the length of the future? Say, one side will be bought out or bankrupt
soon.
A: It doesn’t have to be the same future...
but there does have to be a shared sense that each group will be around
for awhile. This was the case when Kissinger negotiated between Israel
and Egypt. He took lots of little steps. Israel would withdraw a little,
then Egypt would form trade agreements, and so on. They did this bit
by bit, and not all at once.
Q: There are lots of health care providers
blaming each other: Nurses blame labs, labs blame the doctor, who blames
radiologists, and so on. I’m hopeful that one small group can get reciprocity
started. But how do I start that?
A: The problem here is, each side does not know what the other
side did. There needs to be a procedure so we can know who did what,
and what went wrong.
Q: Even if two parties want to agree,
there’s often a third party in healthcare. Physicians might get together
in joint venture with hospital. But there’s no incentive from the HMO
for the hospital to do this.
A: There are several levels at which the third party can involved.
If the HMO will get the benefits from the doctors working with the hospital,
they need to share that with the doctors, so they too have incentive.
The HMO should say “we really have an incentive (mon-etary or otherwise)
for doctors to cooperate with the hospital.” There are also situations
where the third party is a parent to the two orgs. (such as a parent
organiza-tion.) They have to help the players by structuring incentive
for both players to cooperate, and then define what counts as cooperation
and defection. Sometimes, mediators can help the parties under-stand
the consequences of what they’re doing.
Q: What about when a patient sues?
A: That’s a bad
situation, because it’s a one-shot game. The patient says “I don ‘t
like the results I got, and now I’m going to be selfish and take all
I can.” There are no opportunities for reciprocation. So the best you
can do is deal with it early. When the other side is provoked, you should
say right away “yes, the out-come is bad... but there are better ways
to deal with this without escalating.” One possibility is to cooper-ate
and reciprocate with the lawyers: If the legal com-munity has long-term
interaction with hospitals, they may have an interest in cooperation.
About the Presenter
Robert Axelrod, Ph.D. is the Arthur W. Bromage Distinguished University
Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the University of
Michigan. His work in the area of cooperation has received awards from
the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the MacArthur
Foundation and the National Academy of Sciences.
Dr. Axelrod served on committees of the National
Academy of Sciences working with the Soviet Academy of Sciences on arms
control at the end of the Cold War (from 1985 through 1991). He also
participated in a United Nations conference with non-governmental representatives
of the various warring factions in the former Yugoslavia (1995) and
con-sulted for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Command Control, Communications and Intelligence on complexity theory
applied to information policy.